Episode 73 – A 1984 cease-fire as the SADF and FAPLA conduct joint patrols
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Operation Askari has ended but not the recriminations. While on the surface the SADF gave off a great deal of positive propaganda, the loss of 21 men and equipment including three Ratels, and the haphazard manner in which the planning had taken place, was a sign that all was not well.
The morale of the Citizen Force units was unacceptable said the permanent force officers – and they were right. 61 Mech operation archives have a document which named Battle Group Delta otherwise known as Victor as “the worst battle group in 82 Mechanised Brigade”. The armoured squadron had performed well, but in the eyes of seasoned officers, the rest of the personnel had not.
And yet, we also know that the planning for Askari did not follow the comprehensive blueprints of previous ops - battle group Victor had been sent into Cuvelai understrength – sent into a well defended position without superior firepower and without the element of surprise. Pretoria had rushed in where angels feared to tread.
Despite the debriefings which were not a happy process for the SADF, there was a silver lining.
The Angolans were now in a spot of bother. SWAPOs campaigns into Ovamboland had prompted the SADF invasion, now FAPLAs units needed to recover from the battering they’d taken over the past two months. Cassinga was now the southern point of SWAPO action, and the political commissars were negative about trying to head into Ovamboland for the usual summer invasion.
International pressure was also being increased on both the Angolans and the South Africans. By 1984 the American domestic backing for the concept of Constructive Engagement of Pretoria was waning.
It is rather ironic then, that at this precise moment, the Angolan government was also pressurizing SWAPO to find a solution. In December 1983 South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha had sent a letter to UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar, offering to withdraw all troops from Angola for 30 days.
The morale of the Citizen Force units was unacceptable said the permanent force officers – and they were right. 61 Mech operation archives have a document which named Battle Group Delta otherwise known as Victor as “the worst battle group in 82 Mechanised Brigade”. The armoured squadron had performed well, but in the eyes of seasoned officers, the rest of the personnel had not.
And yet, we also know that the planning for Askari did not follow the comprehensive blueprints of previous ops - battle group Victor had been sent into Cuvelai understrength – sent into a well defended position without superior firepower and without the element of surprise. Pretoria had rushed in where angels feared to tread.
Despite the debriefings which were not a happy process for the SADF, there was a silver lining.
The Angolans were now in a spot of bother. SWAPOs campaigns into Ovamboland had prompted the SADF invasion, now FAPLAs units needed to recover from the battering they’d taken over the past two months. Cassinga was now the southern point of SWAPO action, and the political commissars were negative about trying to head into Ovamboland for the usual summer invasion.
International pressure was also being increased on both the Angolans and the South Africans. By 1984 the American domestic backing for the concept of Constructive Engagement of Pretoria was waning.
It is rather ironic then, that at this precise moment, the Angolan government was also pressurizing SWAPO to find a solution. In December 1983 South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha had sent a letter to UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar, offering to withdraw all troops from Angola for 30 days.